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Today, international law – and international human rights law in particular – provides
the dominant frame, often augmented by negotiations, for responding to acts of
genocide. While this frame is necessary, it may not be sufficient to address the
deeper emotional and psychological scars associated with the 1904–1908 genocide
in erstwhile German South West Africa. This is because the colonial project’s
ideological fixity deeply implicates aspects of international law. Moreover, legal
agreement often fails to result in a fair and just outcome. To achieve the latter, moral
arguments seem unavoidable.
Moral arguments come from an older tradition that attempts to think in terms of
what is right and wrong in war, dating to at least the 17th century and even earlier
in the case of some philosophers. Moral arguments, notwithstanding their contested
nature, attempt to bring some order, clarity and moral principles to the problem of
war. Questions of when a war is just, or what counts as “just acts” in the conduct
of war, are ancillary to legal and political questions. While critics may rightly argue
that moral principles are not law, if they are applied consistently and justly, such
principles are not only a tribute to justice, but to humanity. They are a recognition of
the oneness of humanity. Morally, genocide is a form of evil and a crime, an excess
in the words of moral philosopher Emmanuel Levinas.
The moral case against the German state
The moral question is not simply what the former political and military leadership
did in the name of the German state, but why it did what it did. The why part of the
question left the deepest wounds, for it points to casting the Ovaherero and Nama
communities outside of the circle of “civilized” humanity – fated as uncivilized and
inferior to Europeans, belonging to Frantz Fanon’s “zone of non-being.”
There is another reason the moral argument matters. This relates to the concept
of moral responsibility, distinct from legal responsibility. Moral responsibility can
be seen as prospective responsibility, meaning that individuals have a moral
duty to care for or attend to someone or something. Moral responsibility is also
retrospective, arising when a person’s actions are adjudged morally wrong. That
person then deserves to be blamed, held accountable or punished for their actions.
This is certainly the case with respect to genocide.
Mindful of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (1948), the legal definition of what constitutes “genocide” is
clear. To see the hard truth about the morality of Germany’s infamous “extermination
orders” (Vernichtungsbefehle) against the Ovaherero and Nama peoples, the
moral question of the proportionality of means in relation to the threat posed by the
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Ovaherero and Nama communities, is but one part of a more complex argument.
The actions of the German state also violated the “laws of humanity and the public
conscience,” as put forward in The Hague Convention of 1899, to which Germany
was a party. There was a moral culpability of killing by design, which made the
issuing and fulfilment of the extermination orders a moral crime.
Based on the contours of the argument presented above, we can answer the
following questions:
Were the extermination orders necessary? — No.
Were they proportionate to the threat? — No.
Did they go against the drive of humanitarian principles’ aim to enunciate a way of
controlling and limiting war? — Yes.
Did the genocide violate general moral standards recognizedand agreed upon by
Western civilization? — Yes.
Was it morally wrong? — Yes.
The presence of the past: into the future
In essence, this paper argues for the necessity of a moral argument in war; to
suppose that there is no need for a moral argument in war is to condone barbarism.
It is the mark of humanity to make an effort to act morally. Reparations cannot be the
end of the relationship between Germany and Namibia, but they could and should
form part of a process of reasserting our common humanity. Achille Mbembe is right
when he says,
restitution and reparation, then, are at the heart of the very possibility of a
construction of a common consciousness of the world, which is the basis
for the fulfillment of universal justice. The two concepts of restitution and
reparation are based on the idea that each person is a repository of a
portion of humanity. This irreducible share belongs to each of us. (Achille
Mbembe, Critique of Black Reason, WITS University Press, 2017, p. 182)
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